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THIS MEDICATION MAY KILL 
YOU: COGNITIVE OVERLOAD 
AND FORCED COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
DEVIN S. SCHINDLER* 
AND 
TRACEY BRAME** 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born 
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by 
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.” 
 
—Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, Olmstead v. United States 
(1928)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pick up a copy of your favorite lifestyle magazine. Turn to the first 
advertisement you can find for a prescription medication. Typically, you 
will find the picture of a well-heeled model with a sunny disposition 
extolling how the particular medication being advertised changed 
 
*Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.  J.D. University of Michigan Law 
School 1986 (Magna Cum Laude, Order of the Coif); B.A. James Madison College and 
the Honors College at Michigan State University. 
**Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.  J.D. 
University of Michigan Law School 1992; B.A. University of Michigan. 
 1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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his/her/their lives. This is followed by two pages of densely packed 
script, required by the federal government2 and paid for by the 
advertiser, telling you of all the terrible things that could theoretically 
happen if you took the medication.3 
Pharmaceutical advertisements are only but one example of the 
government forcing advertisers to speak. In recent years, various 
government entities have added or attempted to add cell phones,4 
 
 2. The format of those advertisements, down to the font and placement of the 
wording, is mandated by government regulation.  See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013). 
 3. Consider, by way of example, the April 2013 issue of Woman’s Day magazine. 
This issue contains ten advertisements for prescription medicines. WOMAN’S DAY, Apr. 
2013, at 22-24, 49-51, 61-62, 67-69, 75-76, 103-04, 119-20, 125-26, 134-36, 143-44. Of 
those, six pages are dedicated to pure advertisement, such as pictures, logos, tag lines, 
and text extolling the virtues of the product. Id. at 75, 103, 119, 125, 134, 143. Over 
twice as many pages—fifteen and a half—are dedicated to government mandated 
warning labels. Id. at 22-24, 50-51, 61-62, 67-69, 76, 104, 120, 126, 136, 144. One of 
the products advertised, “Pradaxa,” is used to prevent stroke and blood clots in 
individuals with atrial fibrillation. Id. at 49. Strokes are among the most serious health 
risks facing our nation.  According to the Centers for Disease Control, 795,000 
individuals in the United States suffered a stroke in 2011. Stroke Facts, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/stroke/facts.htm (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2013). Of those, approximately 130,000 died. Id. Medications like Pradaxa have 
been shown to be effective in preventing strokes. WOMAN’S DAY, supra, at 49. This fact 
would be quickly lost on a consumer reading the advertisement, who would learn that 
the side effects of the medication include uncontrolled bleeding, coughing up blood, 
chest pain, trouble breathing, and indigestion. Id. at 49-51. Other important information, 
like the fact that the incidences of such side effects are exceedingly rare and the 
medication is safer than its nearest competitor, is not disclosed in the government 
mandated warnings. Pradaxa Side Effects Center, RXLIST, 
http://www.rxlist.com/pradaxa-side-effects-drug-center.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 4. San Francisco passed an ordinance requiring cell phone carriers to distribute a 
“fact sheet” with all products sold, warning consumers of the possible connection 
between cell phone usage and cancer. CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 
494 Fed. App’x 752, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2012). CTIA moved to enjoin the enforcement of 
the ordinance, arguing that under Zauderer, the ordinance, by compelling speech that 
was not factual and uncontroversial, violated retailers’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 
753 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
(1984). The Ninth Circuit agreed with CTIA, noting that while the statements in the fact 
sheet were accurate and not misleading, the revised fact sheet also contained information 
about recommendations regarding what consumers could do to reduce frequency 
emissions. Id. The court held that the language could be interpreted by consumers as 
linking frequency emissions to cancer, a subject of considerable scientific debate. Id. at 
753-54. 
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genetically engineered foods,5 fast food,6 and hundreds of commonly 
used household chemicals7 to the list of products that cannot be sold 
without government mandated messages. These kinds of mandated 
messages sit at the crossroads of two seemingly divergent legal 
doctrines. The first is the forced speech doctrine. In a series of cases 
dating back seventy years, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the government cannot compel individuals to communicate 
messages, with which they disagree except for the most compelling of 
reasons.8 The second is the commercial speech doctrine, in which the 
Court applies intermediate scrutiny to regulations that restrict 
commercial speech.9 
These two lines of cases, one focused on laws compelling speech 
and the other on laws restricting, potentially conflict in situations where 
the government seeks to compel advertisers to convey a message that is 
contrary to their interests. Historically, forced speech that implicates 
“protected speech” is generally subject to strict scrutiny review.10 
However, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, the first case that considered forced speech in the 
commercial context, the Court’s ruling allowed the government to 
mandate disclosures by commercial advertisers to the extent such 
disclosures were “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”11 On its face, Zauderer only applied in the 
narrow situation where the commercial speech was somehow deceptive 
or misleading.12 In dicta, however, the Court also suggested “purely 
 
 5. See, e.g., Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act, H.R. 1699, 113th 
Cong. §2(a) (2013). 
 6. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., R. & REGS., tit. 24, HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2012) 
(requiring New York food establishments to include the calories next to each food item 
on their menu board). 
 7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006); Current 
Proposition 65 List, OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, 
http://www.oehha.org/prop65/prop65_list/Newlist.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) 
(requiring merchants to notify customers of different chemicals that may be present in 
the products they sell). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 10. E.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713, 715-17 (Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to 
invalidate a State statute which forced speech through requiring an ideological state 
motto to be displayed on all license plates). 
 11. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985). 
 12. Id. at 638. 
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factual and uncontroversial” speech might also be compelled.13 Despite 
this dicta, Zauderer left open the question of the government’s authority 
to compel commercial speech where deception is not an issue.14 
The law governing restrictions on commercial speech, in contrast, 
was first set forth in the cases Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (“Virginia Pharmacy”)15 and 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York (“Central Hudson”).16 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held 
that commercial speech was worthy of constitutional protection, despite 
having lesser value than other forms of protected speech.17 The level of 
protection enjoyed by commercial speech was set forth in Central 
Hudson, where the Court ruled that restrictions on such speech were 
subject to what is essentially intermediate scrutiny.18 
The intersecting principles of the forced speech and commercial 
speech doctrines have led to confusion and inconsistent holdings among 
the circuits. In a recent D.C. Circuit case, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
Food & Drug Administration, the court ruled that compelled disclosures 
not strictly designed to prevent deception were subject to the 
intermediate scrutiny standard first applied in Central Hudson.19 Some 
jurists, however, have suggested that compelled commercial speech, at 
least to the extent that it is tied to criminal penalties, is a content-based 
restriction subject to strict scrutiny.20 Yet other courts have ruled that 
Zauderer’s permissive rational basis standard applies to all forced 
commercial speech, irrespective of whether the underlying 
advertisement is deceptive or misleading.21 
 
 13. Id. at 651. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
748, 770-71, 773 (1976). 
 16. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 17. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758, 770. 
 18. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
 19. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214-17 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 20. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that compelled placement of labels warning consumers that a video game is 
“sexually explicit” is subject to strict scrutiny because the warning is controversial and 
“opinion based”). Cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732, 2738 
(2011) (holding that the video game rating system that penalized the sale of games rated 
“violent” or “sexually explicit” to minors was subject to strict scrutiny). 
 21. See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 558-
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Decisions expanding the government’s authority to compel 
commercial speech suffer from three interrelated flaws. First, some 
courts have been too quick to engraft Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny rule onto the only peripherally related field of forced speech.22 
Simply put, a doctrine designed to evaluate restrictions on the time, 
place, and manner of commercial speech has no place in the world of 
forced expression. Second, courts that have shown a willingness to 
expand the government’s authority to compel commercial speech 
inappropriately discount the anti-paternalistic sentiment which animates 
much of First Amendment jurisprudence.23 Simply stated again, absent 
fraud, the government’s ability to turn unwilling advertisers into 
government mouthpieces creates an undue burden on the First 
Amendment’s emphasis on free speech and the marketplace in which it 
operates. Finally, the rationale used most often to justify forced 
commercial speech, i.e. the more information that is given to consumers, 
the more rational their decisions, is likely not true for most commercial 
advertising.  Recent studies of brain pathology suggest that cognitive 
decision making skills actually degrade when consumers are 
overwhelmed with too much information.24  
This article argues that First Amendment theory, when analyzed in 
light of the best currently available scientific evidence regarding 
cognitive decision making, requires courts to be highly skeptical of 
efforts by the government to force advertisers to make statements that 
are contrary to their interests. At the risk of drawing the metaphor to its 
breaking point, government appropriation of private speech is justified 
only when structural deficiencies in the so-called “marketplace of ideas” 
raise a substantial risk of informational monopoly. Such defects most 
often occur when the speaker is essentially lying and the information 
necessary to “check” the claims being made is not readily available. 
Outside of this narrow category, however, compelled disclosure serves 
only the government’s paternalistic interest in controlling the 
marketplace and compelling purchasers to make decisions favored by 
the government, irrespective of the choices these individuals may feel 
are appropriate. The forced commercial speech doctrine should be re-
 
59, 561 (6th Cir. 2012); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45 
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 651, 651 
(1985)), vacated, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 22. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217. 
 23. See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., 674 F.3d at 558.  
 24. See discussion infra Part III.C.3 and notes 155-69. 
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evaluated in light of the principles that underlie First Amendment 
jurisprudence and the current science of cognitive decision making. Such 
a re-evaluation dictates a severe restriction on the government’s 
authority to compel advertisers to convey unwanted messages. 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND COMPELLED 
SPEECH DOCTRINES 
Forced commercial speech sits at the crossroads of two distinct 
bodies of law. The first is the forced speech doctrine, which traces back 
to a 1943 case involving compulsory flag salutes. 
A.  THE FORCED SPEECH DOCTRINE 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court 
struck down a state rule that required all public school students to 
“participate in the salute honoring the Nation” by reciting the pledge of 
allegiance.25 For the first time, the Court recognized that the corollary to 
the freedom of speech was the freedom to not be coerced to express 
messages with which one disagrees. As stated by the Court, forced 
speech is problematic because it “invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution 
to reserve from all official control.”26 The Court suggested that 
compelled speech was among the most egregious violations of the First 
Amendment and could only be justified “on even more immediate and 
urgent grounds than silence.”27 
The relationship between the “freedom of speech” and the 
“freedom of silence” was made manifest in Wooley v. Maynard, in which 
the Court upheld a challenge brought by a Jehovah’s Witness, who 
objected to the phrase “Live Free or Die” appearing on his New 
Hampshire license plate.28 According to the Court, the “right to speak 
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of [the] mind’” protected by 
 
 25. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). The plaintiffs 
in Barnette were two young school children, Jehovah’s Witnesses, who believed that the 
forced flag salute violated the Bible’s prohibition against bowing down to graven images. 
Ironically, the salute mandated by the Board had a disturbing resemblance to the Nazi 
salute. Id. at 627-28. 
 26. Id. at 642. 
 27. Id. at 633. 
 28. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977). 
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the First Amendment.29 This protection extends to both “opinion[s]” one 
would rather not express and to “statements of fact the speaker would 
rather avoid.”30 
B.  THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Constitutional protection for commercial speech, in contrast, came 
of age in the Court’s 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (“Virginia Pharmacy”).31 
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy was called upon to evaluate a state law 
that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising prices.32 The 
Court engaged in a wide-ranging balancing approach, determining that 
commercial speech served important First Amendment interests of both 
the listeners and speakers.33 As to the former, the Court found that 
commercial speech served First Amendment values by providing 
information important to individuals making economic decisions.34 As 
stated by the Court, the “consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information . . . may be . . . keener . . . than his interest in 
the day’s most urgent political debate.”35 Commercial speech further 
served a general societal interest in the free flow of information and 
“enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking [sic] in a democracy.”36 
Commercial speakers also have an obvious interest in the information 
they are disseminating, rooted in the profit motive.37 
 
 29. Id. at 714. See also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974), in which the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to 
publish rebuttals from political candidates criticized by the newspaper. 
 30. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
573 (1995). 
 31. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
776 (1976). 
 32. Id. at 749-50. The Court found advertisements for abortion services 
constitutionally protected in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975), a case 
decided one year before Virginia Pharmacy. That decision came on the heels of Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and was arguably limited to the nature of the constitutionally 
protected services being advertised. Virginia Pharmacy was the first case in which the 
Court specifically ruled that all commercial speech was visible to the First Amendment. 
Paul M. Lohmann, Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law–First Amendment–Protection 
of Commercial Speech, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 129, 138 (1976). 
 33. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 763. 
 36. Id. at 765. 
 37. Id. at 771 n.24. The distinction between lesser protected commercial speech and 
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Despite these values, the Court noted that commercial speech had 
a number of attributes which distinguished it from “political” speech.38  
According to the Court, commercial speech is “more easily verifiable” 
than political speech and, because it is motivated by profit, would likely 
be “more durable” than other forms of speech.39 In a subsequent case, 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Court ruled that “common 
sense” distinctions between commercial speech and other forms of 
speech justified only limited protection of the former, “commensurate 
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”40 
The Court refrained from announcing a single overarching test in 
Virginia Pharmacy. Four years later, however, in Central Hudson, the 
Court adopted a four-part test for evaluating restrictions on commercial 
speech: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come 
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.41 
C.  ZAUDERER AND THE INTERSECTION OF THE TWO DOCTRINES 
A marriage of sorts between the forced speech and commercial 
speech doctrines took place in Zauderer. The defendant in Zauderer was 
an attorney who published a now-typical “no fees unless you win” 
advertisement.42 He was censured under a state disciplinary rule that 
required contingent fee ads to include a disclosure that clients would be 
responsible for court costs irrespective of how the case was ultimately 
 
political speech is not always evident. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (stating that 
advertisements for abortion services contain elements of both commercial and political 
speech). See discussion infra Part III and note 93. 
 38. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. 
 39. Id. at 772. 
 40. Orahlik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). 
 41. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 42. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629-30 
(1985). 
2013 THIS MEDICATION MAY KILL YOU 33 
resolved.43 In its simplest terms, the case turned on resolution of the 
conflict between the presumption against forced speech and the “lesser 
protected” status accorded to commercial speech. Historically, the Court 
had ruled that “forced speech” was perhaps more problematic under the 
First Amendment than outright prohibitions of speech.44 The Court 
reversed this presumption in the context of commercial speech, 
characterizing Zauderer’s “interest in not providing any particular 
factual information” as “minimal.”45 Based on this reordering of the 
presumption, the Court concluded that speech could be compelled in the 
commercial context so long as the disclosure requirements were 
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.”46 Zauderer left the First Amendment as applied to 
commercial speech in curious dichotomy: laws suppressing commercial 
speech were subject to intermediate scrutiny;47 laws compelling speech, 
at least speech necessary to prevent “deception”, however, were subject 
to what is in effect rational basis review.48 
Zauderer’s focus on “preventing deception” left the law of forced 
commercial speech unsettled. On its face, the opinion is relatively 
straightforward: the government can compel commercial speech 
reasonably related to preventing deception.49 But government has an 
incentive, and perhaps reasonable justifications, to compel commercial 
speech to advance interests other than preventing deception, such as 
“consumer education” and ensuring informed decision making. 
Zauderer left open the question of what standard should apply when 
compelled speech was intended to serve some other purpose, such as 
“education.”50 Is compelled commercial speech as constitutionally 
problematic as compelled political speech, which would mandate review 
 
 43. Id. at 634-36. 
 44. Id. at 650. 
 45. Id. at 651. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 
229, 249 (2010) (“[B]ecause the challenged provisions impose a disclosure requirement 
rather than an affirmative limitation on speech, the Government contends that the less 
exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer governs our review. We agree.”). 
 46. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 47. Id. at 647. 
 48. As stated by the Court, “the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure 
requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually 
suppressed . . . .” Id. at 651-52 n.14. 
 49. Id. at 651. 
 50. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 
(D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (formulating the standard under 
which commercial speech can be reviewed). 
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under the “default” strict scrutiny standard that applies to content based 
restrictions? Or should the default rule be Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny test? Or should it be something completely different? 
D.  THE SPLIT AMONG COURTS AND ITS EFFECT 
This debate, and the split among courts it has engendered, has 
arisen most prominently in challenges to government-mandated 
warnings on tobacco products. In one form or another, the federal 
government has required such labels since 1965.51 In 2011, the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued final rules, which greatly upped 
the ante.52 Among other things, the new rules required cigarette 
manufacturers to place on their packaging one of nine graphic images, 
including pictures of diseased lungs, an autopsied corpse, and a man 
smoking a cigarette with a tracheotomy.53 The images were to be 
accompanied by both a 1-800 number operated by the National Cancer 
Institute’s tobacco cessation program and certain factual statements, 
such as “smoking can kill you.”54 Tobacco companies were required to 
reserve the top half of their cigarette packaging, both front and back, for 
the new graphic images.55 
1.  The D.C. Circuit Approach 
Challenges to the new law have resulted in a split between the D.C. 
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit on the appropriate level of scrutiny to be 
applied when considering such challenges. In the D.C. Circuit case, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the court recognized that existing 
Supreme Court precedent left it with three possible choices.56 The 
government argued, inter alia, that Zauderer applied, reading that case 
to stand for the proposition that government could compel commercial 
 
 51. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (2012). 
 52. FDA Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (codified in 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)). 
 53. Cigarette Label and Advertising Warnings, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 
Stat. 1842, 1845 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (d) (2012)). See 
generally 21 C.F.R. § 1141. 
 54. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,629, 36,674. 
 55. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,674. 
 56. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
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advertisers to include any kind of “purely factual” information deemed 
relevant by the government irrespective of whether it was tied to any 
deception by the advertiser. 57 This expansion of Zauderer was justified, 
according to the government, from a statement in the majority opinion 
that a plaintiff’s interest in not disclosing “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” information was “minimal.”58 Essentially the 
government wanted to divorce this statement from the ultimate holding 
of the case, which was that the government could only compel 
disclosures “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception.”59 
The tobacco company plaintiffs, in contrast, argued that the 
absence of “deception” in its advertising placed the case completely 
outside of Zauderer, and squarely back into the rule of “strict scrutiny” 
that applies generally to compelled speech.60 The district court agreed, 
ruling that the graphics went beyond a mere regulation of commercial 
speech into the world of opinion and political speech.61 Alternatively, 
the government argued that compelled commercial speech unrelated to 
deception should be subject to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
standard.62 
The Court rejected the FDA’s argument that Zauderer applied.63  
In doing so, the court narrowed the application of Zauderer to situations 
where the compelled speech was tied to the government’s interest in 
preventing deception, thereby rejecting the argument that Zauderer 
applied anytime the government required disclosure of “purely factual” 
information divorced from any claim of deception.64 This connection 
between the proposed disclosures and deception was absent here, the 
majority concluded, because the new warnings were ostensibly designed 
 
 57. See id. at 1213, 1215-16. 
 58. Id. at 1213-16 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 
(D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 61. Id. at 45-48. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
2001); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 
651-52 (7th Cir. 2006), See also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659, 2667-
68, 2672 (2011) (holding that content based restrictions on dissemination of prescribing 
information by physicians fails both strict and intermediate scrutiny). 
 62. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 1213-16 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
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to “discourage consumers from buying the Companies’ products” and 
not as a “measure designed to combat specific deceptive claims.”65 
The lower court likewise rejected the Zauderer standard, but went 
on to rule that strict scrutiny, the default rule for most compelled speech 
claims, applied.66 The circuit court disagreed, finding that previous D.C. 
Circuit precedent mandated application of Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny standard to compelled speech claims falling 
outside of the Zauderer rule.67 The court assumed that the government’s 
purported interest, to “discourage consumption of tobacco products,” 
was substantial, but found that the purported fit was absent.68 According 
to the court, the government failed to provide a “shred of evidence” that 
the graphic warning would in fact “directly advance” the government’s 
interest in encouraging more people to quit smoking.69 In fact, the 
FDA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis concluded that the graphic warnings 
would reduce U.S. smoking rates by .088%, a figure characterized by the 
FDA as “not statistically distinguishable from zero.”70 
The dissent, in contrast, believed that a decade’s long history by 
tobacco companies of deceiving consumers mandated application of 
 
 65. Id. at 1216. The court went on to rule that even if Zauderer was interpreted as 
covering “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” that lower standard could not 
be met because the required images could not be “rationally be viewed . . . to convey 
[objective] information to consumers” but rather should be viewed as an “unabashed 
attempt[] to evoke emotion.” Id. at 1216-17. See generally Required Warnings for 
Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,649 (June 22, 2011) 
(codified in 21 C.F.R. §1141 (2012)) (showing the new warning rules in question). 
 66. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1212-13, 1217 (citing R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 274 (D.D.C. 2012)); 
see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 
45-46 (2011) (showing the lower court’s similar view). 
 67. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217 (citing United States v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1138, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The court also 
argued in the alternative that the compelled disclosure would still be impermissible under 
the “purely factual and uncontroversial information” standard because the proposed 
images were in themselves not “factual” and did not necessarily make an accurate 
statement regarding cigarettes. Id. at 1216. The graphic nature of the images, the court 
ruled, were “primarily intended to evoke an emotional response” and not to convey 
factual information. Id. at 1216-17. 
 68. Id. at 1218-19 n.12 (quoting INST. OF MEDICINE, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (2007), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php&record_id=11795).  
 69. Id. at 1219. 
 70. Id. at 1220 (quoting Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and 
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,721). Ultimately, the court remanded the case back 
to the FDA for further consideration. Id. at 1222. 
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Zauderer’s less exacting “consumer deception” standard.71 This 
conclusion, in turn, required the court to engage in a three-step inquiry. 
First, the court had to determine whether the cigarette manufacturers’ 
commercial speech presented the “possibility of deception” or had a 
“tendency to mislead.”72 The court then had to determine whether the 
graphics and accompanying text presented “factually accurate” 
information.73 If so, the court would then determine whether mandated 
inclusion of the information was “‘reasonably related’ to the 
government’s interest in effectively conveying the negative health 
consequences of smoking.”74 
The dissent adopted the “possibility of deception” rationale, 
finding that existing warnings on cigarette packages were insufficient to 
fully warn consumers of the inherent risks of smoking.75 Even if they 
were sufficient, the dissent continued, further warnings were justified in 
light of “decades of deception” by manufacturers regarding the utility of 
their product.76 
The majority and dissenting opinions parted company on the 
question of whether the images and accompanying textual information 
was “factual” or “purely emotive.”77 The majority essentially viewed the 
images in isolation, finding them to be non-factual.78 The dissent, in 
contrast, argued that the images had to be considered in light of the 
 
 71. Id. at 1222-23 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette 
Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,633); see also Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985) (where the court discusses 
the public being deceived). 
 72. Id. at 1227 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Milavetz 559 U.S. at 251) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 1230 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 1233 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer 471 U.S. at 651). A veneer 
of administrative law colored both the majority opinion and the dissent. The images and 
accompanying text were formulated in the context of the administrative rulemaking 
process. Hence, the ultimate question more precisely phrased was whether the 
government had “substantial evidence” to conclude that the communication was 
“reasonably related” to preventing deception. See id. 
 75. See id. at 1227-28 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (citing Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 1229 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Phillip Morris USA 
Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(17), 123 Stat. 1776, 1778 (2009); 
Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652). 
 77. See id. at 1216-17, 1222, 1230-31 n.9 (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 78. See id. at 1217.  
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accompanying textual warnings.79 The factual nature of the textual 
language, i.e. “Smoking can kill you” and “Cigarettes are addictive,” 
was not in dispute. Smoking is obviously hazardous to one’s health and 
is addictive. But in an admirable piece of legal sophistry, the dissent 
concluded that the graphic images, although emotive in intent, were 
acceptable because they were designed primarily to draw attention to the 
associated factual statements, and ultimately allowed for those factual 
statements to be better “processed” by the viewer.80 Having decided that 
the overall impact of the mandated communication was “factual” and 
“noncontroversial,” the dissent concluded that the images and 
accompanying text were reasonably related to the government’s interest 
in preventing deception.81 
2.  The 6th Circuit Approach 
The Sixth Circuit took a different tact in its opinion in Discount 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States (“Discount Tobacco”).82 
In Discount Tobacco, like the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
the Sixth Circuit was called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
FDA’s new disclosure regime for tobacco products.83 Like the D.C. 
Circuit, the court recognized, at least implicitly, that the outcome of the 
case turned on the nature of the forced disclosure and the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.84 As to the former, the court ruled that the textual 
warnings were essentially factual, and therefore subject to Zauderer’s 
exception for such “non-controversial, factual” information.85 
The court characterized the graphics, however, as not neutral, but 
“subjective.”86 For that reason, the Plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny.87 
The court found the argument to not be “wholly unpersuasive,” but 
ultimately rejected it on the grounds that the United States Supreme 
Court had never explicitly applied strict scrutiny to purely commercial 
 
 79. Id. at 1230 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting). 
 80. See id. at 1230 (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and 
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,642); see also id. at 1233. 
 81. Id. at 1233. In an abundance of caution, the dissent also argued in the alternative 
that the warnings also passed Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test. Id. at 1235. 
 82. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
83.  Id. at 520.  
 84. Id. at 522. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 526. 
87.  Id. at 525.  
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speech.88 At this point, however, the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 
parted company. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Sixth Circuit upheld the 
graphics requirement in a single sentence, which appears to extend 
Zauderer to even controverted disclosures: “[l]ike other disclosures 
governed by the Zauderer standard, these tobacco disclosures may 
‘appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, 
and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.’”89 
The court’s opinion can be interpreted in one of two ways. The 
court may be saying that all advertisements for tobacco products are 
inherently misleading because many people do not fully appreciate the 
risk, despite years of being warned of those risks by the government and 
the health care industry. Alternatively, the opinion could be interpreted 
as extending Zauderer’s rational basis test to cover even “controversial” 
and non-factual forced speech so long as it is tied to a “non-
controversial” statement (here, the warning labels). In either case, the 
FDA’s graphic warnings were upheld.90 
 Similar distinctions have been drawn by courts evaluating 
statutory schemes that mandate the labeling of “sexually explicit” or 
“violent” video games. In Entertainment Software Association v. 
Blagojevich, to cite one example, the Seventh Circuit distinguished 
between mandated disclosure of “purely factual” and “subjective and 
highly controversial” information, ruling that the former was subject to 
rational basis review, the latter strict scrutiny.91 The Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants took a different approach in 
evaluating a video game labeling law, ruling that strict scrutiny applied, 
because video games were similar to protected “books, plays, and 
movies” and not purely “commercial” in nature.92 
Hence, the battle is joined. The fault lines among the various 
circuits lay at the distinction among (1) forced speech necessary to 
prevent deception; (2) forced disclosure of “factual” and/or 
“noncontroversial” matters; and (3) forced disclosure of “controversial” 
information or “emotive” speech. As for category one, courts have 
 
 88. Id. at 526-27. 
 89. Id. at 527 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)). 
 90. Id. at 551. The dissent sheds little light on the nature of the majority’s decision. 
The dissent applied Zauderer, but suggested that the government could not show that the 
graphics were “reasonably tailored” to achieve the government’s goal of warning 
individuals of the dangers of smoking. Id. at 528. 
 91. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 92. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
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consistently followed Zauderer’s rule that the government can require 
advertisers to include warnings, and the like, as necessary to prevent 
deception. This is relatively non-controversial. Category two, forced 
disclosure of “factual” or non-controversial matters is either subject to 
Zauderer’s rational basis approach or Central Hudson’s intermediate 
test.93 Court’s evaluating category three speech have split between 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test and the default “strict 
scrutiny” standard for content based regulations, although the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion could be interpreted as applying Zauderer even in this 
situation.94 
III. FIRST PRINCIPLES AND UNTANGLING THE THREADS OF FORCED 
SPEECH AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
As should be evident from the myriad of opinions that have been 
authored in the world of forced commercial speech, the marriage 
between Central Hudson and the forced speech doctrine has been 
uneasy. At its bottom, courts that have given the government greater 
leeway to compel statements by commercial advertisers have conflated 
the justifications for giving commercial speech less protection with 
arguments against forced speech in general. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 
for example, the court noted that: 
Whereas in the context of noncommercial speech, “compulsion to 
speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions 
on speech” and thus trigger [strict scrutiny], in the context of 
commercial speech, compulsion to speak may be less violative of 
the First Amendment than prohibitions on speech and thus trigger a 
lower level of scrutiny.95 
The problem with this statement is that applying principles 
 
 93. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(applying rational basis review to state statute that required manufacturers to provide 
informational text regarding the mercury content of their products and discussing how 
the Central Hudson test should apply to statutes that restrict commercial speech). 
 94. Professor Dayna B. Royal, in the article Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-
Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205 (2011), took a slightly different 
approach.  Professor Royal argues that courts have applied a slightly different three tier 
approach: compelled disclosure of “uncontroverted factual information” is subject to a 
“reasonable relationship” test, compelled disclosure of controverted factual information 
is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and compelled disclosure of “ideology” warrants 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 235. 
 95. J.R. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d 1205, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel S. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985)). 
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developed in the context of government prohibiting commercial speech 
are both qualitatively, and quantitatively, different when applied to 
situations where the government is requiring commercial speech. 
Conversely, the fact that laws prohibiting commercial speech are subject 
to a lower level of scrutiny does not mean that laws compelling 
commercial speech ipso facto should reflexively be subject to the same 
lower standard. To understand this distinction requires a further 
discussion of the different constitutional principles that animate the two. 
At bottom, the issue distills to the question of whether laws 
compelling advertisers to speak are more, less or as problematic as laws 
which prohibit certain forms of commercial speech. In the realm of 
political speech, the court has suggested that forced speech is at least as 
problematic, and perhaps more so, then regulatory limits.96 That 
 
 96. See., e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 
(1988) (asserting that the freedom to speak and the freedom to remain silent are co-equal 
under the First Amendment). The court’s analysis in R.J. Reynolds assumes that there is 
a clear demarcation between “political” and “commercial speech.” See J.R. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1226-27. As the Court suggests in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975), a case involving advertisements for abortion services, the 
distinction between “commercial” and “political” speech is not always evident. This 
point was made explicit in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976), where the Court noted that a pharmacist seeking to 
advertise his or her prices could avoid the “commercial speech” label by “cast[ing] 
himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in drug prices.” The recent 
decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) has further 
blurred the distinction between “political” and “commercial” speech. The Court in 
Citizens United ruled that a categorical ban of independent “issue” speech by for-profit 
corporations was subject to the strict scrutiny standard applicable to content based 
restrictions. Id. at 340. Logic suggests that corporations which choose to speak on 
electoral issues are ultimately motivated by profit. Gas companies do not run ads in favor 
of new pipelines because of a benign interest in more pipelines. They do so because there 
is profit to be had by opening up new gas markets. By definition, “pure” commercial 
speech is likewise motivated by profit. Outside of the realm of deception, for-profit 
corporate commercial speech and for-profit corporate political speech serve the same 
master. 
  Part of the confusion in distinguishing the two stems from the somewhat 
inconsistent manner in which the Supreme Court has defined commercial speech. 
Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (“[Commercial speech] does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.”) with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”); 
see also Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (1988) (ruling that solicitations by professional 
fundraisers are not commercial speech because, inter alia, their commercial aspects are 
“inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech”); see also Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (finding that the District Court held 
that proposed mailings are all commercial speech). See generally, Kathryn E. Gilbert, 
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presumption has been flipped in the area of commercial speech, where a 
number of courts have ruled that forced commercial speech is less 
problematic than restrictions on what speakers can say to sell their goods 
and services. 
A.  THE DICHOTOMY AND JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITING SPEECH 
The dichotomy97 drawn by some courts between forced 
commercial speech and forced “political” speech fails to appreciate the 
constitutional values that animate the forced speech doctrine, as 
compared to the values that underlie the analysis of government action 
which prevents speech from being uttered in the first instance. Broadly 
stated, constitutional restrictions on laws that limit speech are justified 
by two principles. First, legal restrictions on speech raise the specter of 
government censorship of unpopular ideas. The danger of government 
censorship scarcely needs to be repeated here. As stated by Justice 
Douglas, “[r]estriction of free thought and free speech is the most 
dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could 
most easily defeat us.”98 Our constitutional condemnation of censorship 
is also justified by the analogy to the marketplace: more speech is better 
than less and a cacophony in the marketplace is the sign of a healthy 
democracy.99 Although volumes have been written on the “marketplace” 
 
Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and Definitions of 
Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591, 594 (2013). 
 97. The concept of whether a particular statement is “non-controversial” is in itself 
problematic, depending on whether the statement being compelled is analyzed at the 
cognitive or the emotive level. In the context of cigarette packaging, the statement 
“smoking harms your health” is cognitively non-controversial. Smoking is bad for your 
physical health. But analyzed at the emotive level, a different answer is possible. The 
message being propounded by cigarette manufacturers—that smoking can be enjoyable 
and is a matter of choice—is being subtly (and not so subtly) undermined by the forced 
disclosure. In essence, the warning that smoking is hazardous for your health is little 
different from the government stating that, “rational people would not choose to smoke 
because smoking is physically harmful.” In defense of the thousands of presumably 
rational people who choose to smoke, the contrary message, i.e. that they are being 
irrational, is controversial. At the granular level, the notice is uncontroversial because it 
is factually true. The same is not true at the macro level, where emotion and bias plays 
on rational decision making. For a general discussion of the effect of bias on decision 
making, see NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS 
FAIL–BUT SOME DON’T 58-59 (2012). 
 98. William O. Douglas, Speech Before the Authors Guild Council: The One Un-
American Act (Dec. 3, 1951), in NIEMAN REPORTS, Jan. 1953, at 20, available at 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/banned/aboutbannedbooks/oneunamerican. 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
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concept, at the bottom, government restrictions on speech are bad 
because they raise the specter of the government using its power to 
squelch messages propounded by the politically disfavored.100 A market 
dominated by one speaker is a monopoly, with all of its attendant 
inefficiencies and corruption. 
B.  THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES THAT JUSTIFY LIMITING 
SPEECH 
Applying these principles to laws restricting commercial speech 
justifies the application of intermediate scrutiny. Censorship and the 
chilling effect that arises from it are less of a concern in the realm of 
commercial speech because self-expression is only part of the speaker’s 
motivation. As recognized by the court in Virginia Pharmacy, the profit 
motive is a powerful antidote to the chilling effect that can result from 
censorship of political speech.101 Conversely, concerns over censorship 
do not arise in the world of forced commercial speech because the 
government in such a case is not, strictly speaking, censoring the 
advertisers’ message. The advertiser remains free to speak so long as she 
includes the message favored by the government. 
The marketplace of commercial ideas, similarly, is not likely to be 
seriously damaged by the occasional government restriction. According 
to a Price Waterhouse Cooper study, internet advertising alone grew 
from $6 billion in 2002 to over $36 billion ten years later.102 By some 
estimates, the total spent on advertising in the United States exceeded 
$140 billion in 2012.103 Common sense and experience suggests that a 
regulation prohibiting advertisers from lying about their product is 
unlikely to substantially impair the vibrancy of the advertising 
 
dissenting) (“[E]ffective self-government cannot succeed unless the people are 
immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting 
which are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination.”). 
 100. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335-37; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 
377, 396 (1992). 
 101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
 102. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, IAB INTERNET ADVERTISING REPORT: 2012 FULL YEAR 
RESULTS, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU 10  (2013), available at 
http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2012_r
ev.pdf. 
 103. Kantar Media Reports U.S. Advertising Expenditures Increased 3 Percent in 
2012, KANTAR MEDIA (Mar. 11, 2013), http://kantarmediana.com/intelligence/press/us-
advertising-expenditures-increased-3-percent-2012.  
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marketplace. 
C.  CONCERNS WITH FORCED SPEECH 
The concern with forced speech is premised on different value 
judgments, however, which apply with equal force to commercial and 
non-commercial speakers.104 Foremost, forced speech is problematic 
because it results in the government invading the “sphere of intellect and 
spirit which . . . is the purpose of the First Amendment to our 
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”105 The term self-
expression, when used in the context of the forced speech doctrine is 
very telling. As recognized by Professor Nimmer, “freedom of 
expression is an end in itself.”106 Or, as Justice Brandeis suggested in 
his seminal concurrence in Whitney v. California, self-expression is 
necessary for self-fulfillment, which in turn is the “secret of 
happiness.”107 Forced expression of a government dictated message 
with which one disagrees is by definition antithetical to the “self” in the 
phrase “self-expression.”108 
1.  The Interests of the Speaker and Listener 
The Court, as well as common sense, recognizes that the First 
Amendment’s concern with the “sphere of intellect” in the context of 
forced speech implicates the interests of both “speakers” and 
“listeners.”109 This is particularly true for commercial speech.  
Successful advertisers sell a life style. Hence, Nike’s “Just Do It” or 
 
 104. For a detailed description of the dichotomy between the interests of the speaker 
and those of the listener, see Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech 
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (2011). 
 105. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 106. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment 
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 949 (1968). 
 107. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
 108. For an insightful discussion of the values served by the forced speech doctrine, 
See Royal, supra note 94, at 209; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
234-35 (1977) (“at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion . . . that in a free society 
one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the 
State”). 
 109. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (discussing how commercial speech serves the interests of both 
speakers and listeners); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) (stating that protection of commercial speech serves 
primarily the interests of listeners). 
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DeBeers “A Diamond is Forever” ad campaigns were successful in part 
because they convinced individuals that use of their products would 
result in the purchaser expressing a message of “high performing” or 
“adventurous,”110 in the case of Nike, or “sophisticated” in the case of 
DeBeers.111 Nike’s efforts to express its favorite message, and the 
transference to the consumer of the favored attributes, would have been 
rendered ineffectual had the government required the “truthful” 
disclosure that “doing it” too much or “doing it” without proper training 
can result in bad knees, sore backs and myriad of aches and pains. The 
speaker has an interest in fostering a certain brand image through 
advertisement. 
The interest of the speaker in selling an image is self-evident. Less 
obvious, but equally important, is the listener’s interest in adopting as 
part of their own self-image the conveyed message. People don’t wear 
Nike logo shirts because they are inexpensive. They wear them because 
the Nike message has become part of their identity and self-expression. 
People who wear Nike brand apparel are communicating a message to 
the world: “I am active,” “I am a ‘doer’,” “I am an athlete,” and “I am 
competitive.”112 Nike has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to foster 
that message and it has been adopted by scores of individuals who want 
to share in its attributes. Forcing Nike to change the message in the 
interest of full disclosure risks destroys the message, a message that 
individual consumers may find important to their own self-
fulfillment.113 
Forced speech is also contrary to the interests of listeners to obtain 
information free from government distortion. The problem of distortion 
exists at two levels. First, forced speech can increase listener confusion 
 
 110. Ibrahim Hegazy, Nike: Building a Global Brand: Case Analysis (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.slideshare.net/Ahmed_Coucha/brand-managment-nike-building-a-global-
brand-case-analysis (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 111. Both of these ad campaigns have been recognized as being among the most 
successful and iconic ever. Top Ad Campaigns of the 20th Century, CNBC NEWS, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/43673665 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013); Lauren Sorenson, The 10 
Greatest Marketing Campaigns of All Time, HUBSPOT (May 8, 2012, 12:30 
PM), http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/32763/The-10-Greatest-Marketing-
Campaigns-of-All-Time.aspx#ixzz2LGdUn3O3. 
 112. Rajeev Batra & Pamela Miles Homer, The Situational Impact of Brand Image 
Beliefs, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 318, 320 (2004). 
 113. The concept of brand imaging is endemic to the world of advertising, i.e. Air 
Jordan tennis shoes, Calvin Klein apparel, Victoria’s Secret Lingerie, The Marlboro 
Man. In each case, and thousands of others too lengthy to list, the goal of the advertiser 
is to transfer to the user an image that comes with the use of their product. 
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because the identity of the speaker is not always evident. As stated by 
Justice Souter in his dissent in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Association, no one who reads an advertisement advertising “Beef, it’s 
What’s for Dinner” attributed to “America’s Beef Producers” would 
“suspect that the message comes from the National Government.”114 
Absent a “warning label” (i.e., “this warning is brought to you by the 
federal government”) on a “warning label,” someone reading a tobacco 
package or a pharmaceutical advertisement has no way of knowing who 
is actually speaking when they are being informed about the risks of the 
product. The forced speech doctrine recognizes that listeners have an 
interest in being able to identify the actual speaker, which can become 
muddled when individuals are compelled to add information they would 
otherwise prefer to exclude.115 In other words, the listener has a First 
Amendment right to hear “pure” speech that has not been obscured by 
the government.116 
Second, tying government speech to the advertiser’s preferred 
message can amplify, and therefore distort, the value of the government 
message.117 Weighing the relative value of any message is tricky 
business, but one does not need a Ph.D. in Cognitive Studies to 
understand how a listener might overvalue the message “this medicine 
may cause death” when it is tied to the favored (and presumably 
accurate) message that “taking this product may save your life.” 
Related to distortion is the concept of “dilution.” Forceful speech 
without caveat is effective speech. “F*** the Draft” conveys a more 
powerful message than “F*** the Draft, Although it May be Necessary 
to Maintain Military Preparedness.”118 Although the latter may be more 
accurate, the former more clearly and effectively conveys the speaker’s 
message. In the context of commercial speech, saying “Cialis will 
 
 114. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 577 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); George Lazarus, Beef Group Stakes New Ads on Dinner, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 25, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-03-
25/business/9201270703_1_beef-consumption-beef-and-other-meats-beef-industry-
council. 
 115. See Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government 
Speech Doctrine and What is Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 102-03 (2011) (noting 
that the program in Johanns confused listeners on the identity of the speaker). 
 116. Sacharoff, supra note 104, at 333 (arguing that the First Amendment right in 
commercial speech cases belongs to the listener, and that the listener’s right to pure 
speech is infringed when the government forces private companies to tout its message 
through disclosures). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
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improve your love life” is more powerful than “Cialis will give you an 
erection, if it doesn’t kill you or increase your blood pressure.” Again, 
the latter may be more accurate, but the former leaves no doubt as to the 
speaker’s message. Commercial speakers, no less than political 
speakers, have both an incentive and a right to convey their messages 
forcefully. Indeed, the more forceful the speech, the more likely that it 
will engender an equally forceful response. This, of course, is the basis 
for the entire “marketplace of ideas” theory of speech.119 Forcing an 
advertiser to publicize the “other side” dilutes the advertiser’s preferred 
message.120 
2.  Paternalism and Autonomy 
Forced speech is also paternalistic. At the core of the First 
Amendment lies the principle of autonomy, i.e., the notion that each 
individual should have the autonomy to make decisions free from undue 
outside influence.121 The concept of paternalism and related concept of 
autonomy are notoriously difficult to define. As defined by the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, paternalism “is the interference of a state 
or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or 
motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or 
protected from harm.”122 Professor Lowenstein similarly defines 
paternalism as “speech restrictions intended to protect the consumer 
against his or her own imprudent action.”123 In either case, 
 
 119. Consider the flag burner in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Burning a 
flag is among the most forceful and emotive way to express dissatisfaction with 
government policy. Had Johnson merely stood on a corner denouncing American foreign 
policy, he would have been quickly forgotten. By burning the flag, Johnson’s protest 
continues to reverberate. But the force of his speech was ultimately met with an equally 
powerful response. An onlooker, outraged by Johnson’s speech, took the burned flag and 
accorded it a respectful burial. Id. at 420. 
 120. As stated by the Supreme Court in Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 
487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988), “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make 
necessarily alters the content of the speech.” 
 121. As stated by John Stuart Mill, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. . . . Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”  JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 22 (4th ed. 1869) 
 122. Paternalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).  
 123. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and 
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1238 (1988). In the interest of full 
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“paternalism” is problematic because it posits that individuals are less-
than-rational in their decision making, and therefore, need an outside 
agent to guide them towards making a logical decision.124 This in turn 
raises two philosophical concerns. First, the very concept of liberty is 
rooted at some level on the notion of individual autonomy. The freedom 
to make choices posits the freedom to make decisions free from undue 
influence. Hence, wills may be voided if the “consent” of the deceased 
was obtained through undue influence.125 Contracts of adhesion, where 
one party to the contract did not have the autonomy to make a true 
choice, are similarly invalid.126 Fraud is both a tort and crime in part 
because the defrauded party made a decision that was not truly 
autonomous, but obtained through artifice.127 
In a related fashion, paternalism posits that the speaker is wiser, 
more knowledgeable and simply “knows better” than the person 
receiving the information; but no person, much less a government, can 
truly make wholly objective decisions. The decision the government is 
attempting to coerce by placing unwanted messages in the mouths of 
advertisers may—or may not—be the best decision for the person 
receiving the information.  Individuals can logically consent to harm. 
People can logically decide the utility of eating a greasy hamburger is 
greater than losing that extra five pounds. A decision made by any 
individual free from coercion may be better, for that individual, than the 
decision favored by the government.128 
The freedom of autonomy also presupposes the freedom to choose 
 
disclosure, Professor Lowenstein disagrees with the argument that the Virginia statute 
was paternalistic, arguing instead that overall consumer utility would be served by not 
allowing low-cost, low-quality pharmacists to “ free ride” on the overall reputation of 
the profession. Id. at 1239-40. Professor Dworkin sets a slightly different tone, defining 
paternalism as “roughly the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values 
of the person being coerced.” Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE 
LAW 107-08 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971). 
 124. Lowenstein, supra note 123, at 1238.   
 125. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts  § 1 (1983). 
 126. See, e.g., Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237, 240 (Mont. 
2005). 
 127. C.f. Smith v. Richards, 38 U.S. 26, 39 (1839) (discussing how materially untrue 
statements deprive listeners of information they need to make a wise decision). 
 128. Although still in its infancy, recent scholarship suggest that a lesser informed 
decision, that is to say an instinctual decision, may often times end up better than a 
decision made after ample reflection.  See E-mail from Angelika Dimoka, Dir., Ctr. for 
Neural Decision Making, Temple Univ., to Devine Schindler, Professor of Law, Thomas 
M. Cooley Law School (Feb. 19, 2013, 09:53 EST) (on file with author).   
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what sources to consider when making a decision. As stated by Professor 
Lowenstein, “the decision of what information to acquire is itself one of 
the self-determining choices humans make.”129 Hence, a person can 
rationally decide to forgo internet research regarding which television is 
the best or which car gets the best mileage, knowing full well that they 
have chosen to make a lesser-informed decision. Forcing an advertiser 
to relay the government’s contrary message takes that autonomy away 
from the consumer who makes a conscience choice to not seek additional 
information before making a decision. 
The political community should be particularly vigilant when the 
coerced message is the governments. As argued by Stephen Gardbaum: 
With respect specifically to authority, the state is special because it 
cannot purport to act nonauthoritatively. A way of life that the state 
endorses and promotes, even through symbolic or persuasive 
means, is an “authorized” way of life. The concern is that 
individuals may defer to the state’s authority, just as we normally 
wish them to do in the case of general obedience to the law. Yet, 
adopting a valuable way of life out of deference to authority is 
counterproductive from the perspective of autonomy.130 
This is particularly true when the government is one step removed 
from listener. A listener to speech attributed to the government at least 
has the benefit of being able to evaluate the idea being advanced 
knowing that the government is the proponent. When government 
requires others to speak on its behalf, however, the listener’s ability to 
consider the speaker is undermined.131 
The Supreme Court has identified “autonomy,” the inverse of 
paternalism, as a value embodied in the First Amendment. In Virginia 
Pharmacy, to cite one example, the Court rejected the state’s argument 
that allowing pharmacists to advertise price information would result in 
“unwitting customers” utilizing the services of “low quality” 
pharmacists.132 Finding this approach to be “highly paternalistic,” the 
 
 129. Lowenstein, supra note 123, at 1244. 
 130. Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 385, 398 (1996) (citations omitted); see Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 
YALE L.J. 1611, 1620 (1991); see also Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence 99 YALE 
L.J. 945 (1990); see generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 70-109 (1986). 
 131. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of listener 
confusion). 
132. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 769-70 (1976).   
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Court concluded that opening the channels of communication would 
serve the value of autonomy by allowing individuals to make informed 
decisions on what is in “their own best interests.”133 
A similar approach was employed by the Court in Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., in which the Court 
struck down a North Carolina law that required professional fundraisers 
to disclose the actual amount they passed onto charities before making a 
solicitation.134 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the law was 
necessary to protect the charities for their own benefit on the grounds 
that such a highly “paternalistic” justification was contrary to the First 
Amendment presumption “that speakers, not the government, know best 
both what they want to say and how to say it.”135 As perhaps best stated 
by Justice Jackson, “[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to 
foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public 
mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion.”136 
Granted, the Court has not been entirely consistent in its approach 
to paternalistic restrictions on speech. Hence, in Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, the Court upheld a 
prohibition on advertisements for casino gambling which was largely 
justified by the government’s paternalistic belief that gambling harms 
the individual.137 In the context of the regulation of commercial speech, 
the Court recognized paternalism as a legitimate justification under the 
 
 133. Id.; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“We 
have previously rejected the notion that the Government has an interest in preventing the 
dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of the 
public from making bad decisions . . .”). 
 134. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1983). 
 135. Id. at 790-91. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 
(1986) (rejecting the State’s argument that a closed primary law was justified as 
protecting a political party from “from undertaking a course of conduct destructive of its 
own interests”); Linmark Ass’n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (rejecting as 
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 136. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 137. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 
348 (1986). Given the rise of state sponsored lotteries, and the ample government-
sponsored advertising that comes with them, Posadas highlights the danger that 
government compelled speech can have the paradoxical effect of increasing consumer 
confusion. On the one hand, states that sponsor and advertise lotteries are communicating 
the message that gambling is a fun, potentially remunerative activity.  Prohibiting 
advertisements of private casinos, on the other hand, communicates the exact opposite 
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Constitution that may ultimately be unavoidable.138 
Perhaps ironically, paternalism as a normative value has been 
justified as expanding the freedom of autonomy. Autonomous decision 
making presupposes that individuals are armed with all information 
necessary to make a rational decision.139 Under this doctrine 
“paternalism”, and by extension, “forced speech”, is acceptable when 
necessary to insure fully informed decision making.140 John Stuart Mill, 
in his work, On Liberty, illuminates this point through the example of 
the damaged bridge.141  Assume that you are observing a person who 
does not speak your language approaching a damaged bridge that is 
likely to collapse if he or she treads upon it. Paternalism—say stopping 
the individual before they cross the bridge to ensure they are aware of 
the danger—is appropriate in this context, according to Mill, because the 
decision to cross without this knowledge is not truly autonomous.142 To 
extend the analogy, the government in the cigarette labeling cases is 
essentially arguing that the coerced labeling is necessary because 
individuals who are choosing whether to smoke, like the fictional bridge-
crosser, lack enough information to make a truly rational decision. 
Mill’s argument should be rejected in the context of forced 
commercial speech. First, the analogy is premised on the idea that the 
relevant information, i.e., the condition of the bridge, is only readily 
available from the bystander observing the bridge. But that is certainly 
not true in society awash in web pages, twitter accounts, 250 cable 
stations and traditional publications. With rare exceptions143 the 
information necessary to make fully informed decisions is available, 
irrespective of whether the government forces the advertiser to include 
it in their message. The message that cigarettes are addictive and harmful 
 
 138. Id. at 339-40; see, e.g., James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits 
of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
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to one’s health has been—and continues to be—amply disseminated.144 
Simply put, anyone who first learns from reading a cigarette package 
that cigarettes can be dangerous has lived far too long under a rock. 
Second, the concept of autonomy presupposes the right to ignore 
information others may find relevant. The decision whether to seek 
additional information, given a finite period of time and cognitive 
capability, is as much an exercise of autonomy as the ultimate decision 
whether to purchase a particular product.145 To draw the bridge analogy 
to beyond its breaking point, the “bridge” (here, the decision to be made 
by the consumer) has a sign in front of it that says “important information 
below—proceed at your own risk” followed by a detailed description of 
the condition of the bridge. At that point, the decision to proceed without 
reading the information is made autonomously. The bridge crosser who 
ignores the sign has made an autonomous decision, no different than the 
crosser who reads the sign and goes forward despite the potential danger. 
The decision to purchase cigarettes without bothering first to research 
their possible effects is likewise an exercise of autonomy. 
3.  More Information is Not Always Better Than Less 
Perhaps the biggest concern with compelled commercial speech, 
however, is that its fundamental precept, the commonsense notion that 
“more” information is always better than “less,”146 is likely wrong. The 
idea that more speech leads to better decision making is deeply rooted in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.147 If true, this principle would support 
 
 144. Typing in the phrase “tobacco” and “health risks” into the Google search engine 
results in over 3 million “hits.” 
 145. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 
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 146. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are 
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different rules for government restrictions on speech and compelled 
speech.  Government restrictions on speech, the argument goes, are more 
problematic than forced speech because they tend to restrict information 
from reaching the marketplace. Compelled speech, in contrast, serves 
the purpose of expanding the amount of information available to 
consumers. In practical terms, devotion to the theory that “more is 
better” would result in a less burdensome standard of review of statutes 
and regulations that forced disclosures, at least to the extent that such 
disclosures are factual and non-controversial.148 
But recent scholarship suggests otherwise. In his popularizing book 
Blink, former science reporter Malcolm Gladwell makes a compelling 
case for the argument that decisions made “very quickly”, i.e. with a 
minimal amount of deliberation, can be as good or even better than 
decisions made after an extended period of reflection and information 
gathering.149 Citing studies and anecdotes from the military, medicine, 
science, sports, and even dating, Gladwell and the researchers he cites 
come to the counterintuitive conclusion that too much information can 
lead to less optimal decision making.150 
Consider the story told by Gladwell of the creation of a flow chart 
now in common use for determining whether an individual presenting in 
an emergency room is suffering a coronary infarction.151 In 1996, Cook 
County Hospital in Chicago was the facility of last choice. A 
combination of dilapidated facilities and budget woes had resulted in the 
Hospital’s emergency department being overwhelmed.152 In an effort to 
clear the quagmire, the Chairman of the Hospital’s Department of 
Medicine, Brendan Reilly, began studying how the emergency 
department could better manage patients presenting with chest pain.153 
Historically, the decision whether to admit someone with chest pain was 
 
opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-
examination.” United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
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made by individual physicians.154 Consistent with common sense, 
physicians employed the “more is better” rule, ordering multiple tests 
and doing extensive examinations.155 
Reilly concluded that much of the information being collected and 
reviewed was unnecessary.156 He then developed a flow chart algorithm 
that required only four inputs.157 A two-year follow up study comparing 
the “less information” method of diagnosing coronary infarctions with 
the traditional “more is better” method revealed that the algorithm 
method was 95% accurate, compared with an accuracy rate between 75% 
to 89% for the traditional method.158 Not only was the “less is more” 
approach more accurate, but by limiting the amount of information being 
considered, the algorithm helped to clear the Emergency Department so 
it could give better and more timely service to more patients.159 
Gladwell concludes that in terms of diagnosing heart problems, “extra 
information is more than useless[] [i]t’s harmful[] [and] [i]t confuses the 
issues.”160 
Gladwell’s conclusion is well-grounded in science. A number of 
studies have concluded that  information overload, or at least perceived 
information overload, is a real phenomenon that results in individuals 
ultimately making less than ideal choices.161 Information overload arises 
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when our mammalian brains honed for survival in the bush collide with 
an increasingly complex world.162 The perfectly rational individual 
capable of absorbing and effectively processing all relevant information 
before making a decision is a myth. In his seminal work on the limits of 
rationality, social scientist Herbert Simon argued that at best people are 
“boundedly rational”; the boundary being the limits of our cognitive 
ability.163 Or, as stated by one set of authors, “[i]n short, even with 
technology, there is only so much we humans can know, learn, mentally 
absorb, and incorporate into a broader Weltanschauung.”164 
The limits in our cognitive ability to absorb information results, 
Simon argues, in rational people “satisficing” as opposed to 
“optimizing” in making decisions. Hence, an individual faced with too 
much information will choose the first option that meets whatever 
aspirational level has been set by that person, as opposed to absorbing 
and processing the additional information necessary to make the optimal 
decision.165 
A number of studies have suggested that too much information can 
interfere with bounded rational decision making. First, the brain 
confronted with too much information can essentially decide, 
subconsciously, to “surrender” and ignore rationality in favor of 
emotion.166 Consider the plight of the average investor deciding whether 
to purchase a CD, the stock of an established blue chip company, the 
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stock of a high-flying tech company or a mutual fund. The buyer initially 
considers two variables—price and risk. But then comes the 100+ page 
prospectus (in the case of the mutual fund) or the annual report (in the 
case of the blue-chip company). The information available to the 
investor compounds geometrically. P/E ratios, five year trends, inflation 
risks, litigation risk and the like begin to crowd into the equation. At 
some point, too many investors throw up their hands and make the choice 
based on what their broker told them last. The broker, however, is not 
necessarily any better capable or processing the information available 
and his or her decision making may easily be influenced by their own 
self-interest (i.e. the commission is higher on the mutual fund.). The 
onslaught of information may result in a worse decision than one that 
considered only price and risk, just as a physician confronted with 
dozens of variables may choose a worse course of treatment than one 
who considers the four data points described in Gladwell’s book.167 
Cognitive overload can also result in placing too much emphasis 
on the wrong or less relevant information. To use a colloquialism, too 
much information can result in the decision maker losing sight of the 
proverbial forest for the trees. The idea that people tend to remember 
,and, therefore, overvalue the first information they receive (“primacy”) 
and the last information (recency) is well established.168 This cognitive 
truism, however, can result in less optimal decision making when the 
information received first or last is in reality of little importance. Hence, 
if by statute the message “this medication can help you” is buried among 
a flurry of government mandated negative messages (“this medication 
may cause bleeding”), an otherwise rational decision maker may make 
the “wrong” decision for the wrong reasons. 
Although the specifics differ, most studies of information overload 
have concluded that at some point, usually between the introduction of 
the fifth through tenth variable, concentration wanes and individuals’ 
decision making ability degrades.169 The physiology of this 
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phenomenon was observed for the first time in a study recently 
completed by Angelika Dimoka, director of the Center for Neural 
Decision Making at Temple University. Doctor Dimoka used a 
“functional magnetic resonance imaging” (fMRI) scanner to observe the 
brain activity of individual who were participating in an exercise known 
as “combinatorial auctions.”170 In a combinatorial auction, participants 
are asked to make optimal bids on a number of items being offered either 
individually or in combination.171 As the auction progresses, bidders are 
required to process a steadily increasing amount of information.172 Brain 
activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain 
responsible for higher cognitive functions, increases as the volume of 
information increases.173 At some point, however, the brain becomes 
overwhelmed and starts to act less rationally. As described by Dr. 
Dimoka, “[t]he bidders reach cognitive and information overload.”174 
Ultimately, too much information results in “people’s decisions making 
less and less sense.”175 
D.  COGNITIVE OVERLOAD, COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND “REAL WORLD” 
DECISION MAKING 
The concept of information overload has not been lost on the court. 
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin the Court ruled that the Truth in 
Lending Act did not require lenders to include a detailed description on 
the first page of the loan of the lenders right to accelerate payment of the 
debt.176 The Court’s reasoning was based in part on recognition that “too 
much” disclosure could have a paradoxical effect: 
The concept of “meaningful disclosure” that animates TILA . . . 
cannot be applied in the abstract. Meaningful disclosure does not 
mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between 
“competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the need 
to avoid . . . [informational overload.]” . . . And striking the 
appropriate balance is an empirical process that entails investigation 
 
alternatives exceeds five). 
 170. E-mail from Angelika Dimoka, supra note 128. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
174.  Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980). 
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into consumer psychology[.]177 
The concept of “informational overload,” recognized by the Court 
in Ford Motor Credit, and the poor decisions it can lead to, is particularly 
problematic in the world of advertising.178 Consider the world of 
pharmaceutical advertisements, which are heavily regulated by federal 
law.  Manufacturers who wish to advertise their medications, for 
example, are told: (1) where and how the ingredients must be listed;179 
(2) what the drug can be called;180 and (3) the font that must be used in 
print advertisements.181 Most importantly, advertisers of pharmaceutical 
products are required to include a “brief summary” of every possible side 
effect that might potentially arise from use of the medication: 
All advertisements for any prescription drug . . . shall present a true 
statement of information in brief summary relating to side effects, 
contraindications . . . and effectiveness. Advertisements broadcast 
through media such as radio, television, or telephone 
communications systems shall include information relating to the 
major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs in 
the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless 
adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or 
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast 
 
 177. Id. at 568. 
 178. See, e.g., John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1454 (1999) (“[I]t is 
naive to presume that consumers can rationally process all the information necessary to 
optimize their purchases.”). Professor Hanson and Kysar are highly critical of advertisers 
and pharmaceutical advertisers in particular, accusing them of market manipulation 
bordering on fraud. Id. at 1455-57. Their solution is to expand the concept of “enterprise 
liability” to encompass “egregious” “market manipulation” by advertisers. Id. at 1556. 
Consistent with the views of the authors of this essay, Professors Hanson and Kysar 
agree that government “command and control” regimes whereby market manipulation is 
regulated by the government are ineffective. Id. 
 179. “The ingredient information required by section 502(n) of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall appear together, without any intervening written, printed, 
or graphic matter, except the proprietary names of ingredients, which may be included 
with the listing of established names.” 21 C.F.R § 202(a)(1) (2013). 
 180. “The advertisement shall not employ a fanciful proprietary name for the drug or 
any ingredient in such a manner as to imply that the drug or ingredient has some unique 
effectiveness or composition, when, in fact, the drug or ingredient is a common 
substance, the limitations of which are readily recognized when the drug or ingredient is 
listed by its established name.  §202(a)(3). 
 181. “The established name shall be printed in letters that are at least half as large as 
the letters comprising the proprietary name or designation with which it is joined . . . .” 
§202(a)(5)(b)(1). 
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presentation shall contain a brief summary of all necessary 
information related to side effects and contraindications.182 
In addition to the required disclosures, the regulations also explain 
twenty ways in which an advertisement is false, lacking in fair balance 
or otherwise misleading,183 as well as thirteen ways in which an 
advertisement may be false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise 
misleading.184 As a result, the average pharmaceutical advertisement 
contains over twice as much “disclosure” as it does “advertisement.”185 
The upshot of this regulatory system is that pharmaceutical 
advertisers are obligated to disclose what are essentially non-existent 
risks. This mandated “over disclosure” likely has detrimental real world 
consequences. As it turns out, people are generally terrible at assessing 
risk, particularly when an activity poses an infinitesimal, but highly 
consequential risk. In plain language, people overreact to miniscule risk. 
This form of decision bias, known as probability neglect, results in 
people overestimating risk and making irrational decision to avoid it.186 
Consider a study done by Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of 
Chicago in which he presented law students—presumably a cognitively 
advanced group—with four different scenarios involving cancer from 
 
 182. § 202(e)(1). 
 183. § 202(e)(6)(i-xx). 
 184. §202(e)(7)(i-xiii). 
 185. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 186. See, e.g., Peter M. Sandman et al., Communications to Reduce Risk 
Underestimation and Overestimation, 3 RISK DECISION & POL’Y 93, 93 (1998), available 
at http://www.petersandman.com/articles/underest.htm. In this study, 1,402 test subjects 
were given three hypothetical news stories involving radiation threats in the home. Id. at 
95. In one of the stories, the radioactive threat came from natural occurring radon. Id. at 
97. In the latter two, the risk came from sands used by a nearby nuclear waste facility 
that had been used to cover spent nuclear power fuel rods.) Id.   In one case, the sand had 
been illegally used to make concrete for the home’s foundations. Id. In the other, the 
radioactive threat from the concrete was not discovered until after the fact. Id. Critically, 
in all three cases, the risk of danger was identical, one in one million. Id. Notwithstanding 
that the risk in all three cases was identical, test subjects perceived a much greater threat, 
and a higher willingness to take actions to reduce that threat, when considering the 
nuclear power story. Id.; Peter M. Sandman et al., Agency Communication, Community 
Outrage, and Perception of Risk: Three Simulation Experiments, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 585, 
585-98 (1993), available a: http://www.psandman.com/articles/simulate.htm. See also 
Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, 
Reason, Risk, and Rationality 21 (Nat’l Cancer Inst. Workshop on Conceptualizing and 
Measuring Risk Perceptions, Decision Research Paper, 2003), available at 
http://dccps.nci.nih.gov/BRP/presentations/slovic.pdf. 
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arsenic poisoning.187 The first group was asked how much they would 
pay to eliminate a 1/1,000,000 risk of contracting cancer from arsenic 
poisoning from water. The second group was asked the same question, 
but the risk was reduced to 1/100,000.188 The third group was presented 
with 1/1,000,000 risk, but the cancer was described in excruciating 
detail.189 The final group was given the same detailed description, with 
the risk again reduced to 1/100,000.190 Commonsense would suggest that 
a person should be willing to pay ten times more to eliminate a risk that 
is ten times more likely. In fact, Sunstein found that students were only 
willing to pay just over twice as much to avoid the much higher risk.191 
From this, and his review of dozens of other studies, Sunstein concludes: 
[W]hen intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the 
adverse outcome, not on its likelihood. That is, they are not closely 
attuned to the probability that harm will occur. At the individual 
level, this phenomenon, which I shall call “probability neglect,” 
produces serious difficulties of various sorts, including excessive 
worry and unjustified behavioral changes.192 
The work done by Sunstein and others illustrate the potential 
problem with government mandated “over” disclosure. Consider an 
advertisement for the medication, Orencia, which has appeared recently 
in a number of lifestyle magazines.193 Orencia has been shown to 
successfully treat moderate to severe rheumatoid arthritis.194 
Rheumatoid arthritis is an autoimmune disease that causes progressive 
destruction of joints, the circulatory system and the lungs.195 The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that over 1.5 million 
Americans suffer from this disabling disease.196 
 
 187. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 
YALE L. J. 61, 77 (2002). 
 188. Id. at 78. 
 189. Id. 
190.  Id.   
191. Id. at 79. 
 192. Id. at 62-63. 
 193. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Orencia, Oh Yes I Can, WOMAN’S DAY, Apr. 2013, at 
134-36. 
194.  Id. at 136.  
 195. Rheumatoid Arthritis, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001467/. 
 196. Arthritis-Related Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/arthritis/data_statistics/arthritis_related_stats.htm (last visited Nov. 
12, 2013). 
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Although this medication has proven to be effective and safe, the 
federal government nonetheless requires the advertiser to disclose rare 
and potentially idiosyncratic side effects. In fact, although “cancer” is 
listed as a potential risk in the Orencia ad,197 there is no evidence that 
the medication exacerbates or causes cancer. Pneumonia, also a listed 
potential risk, occurred in only 0.4% of the patients.198 If Sunstein is 
correct, this forced speech will have the paradoxical effect of convincing 
some patients to not take the medication, even though a purely rational 
decision maker would. 
This suggestion is supported by a number of studies on the 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical advertisements. In a 1995 study, for 
example, researchers found that disclosure statements which contained 
too much information left consumers confused, doubtful and even 
overwhelmed about the efficacy of advertised medication.199 A 2005 
study of television advertisements similarly reported that increasing the 
number of risk statements in an advertisement increased the likelihood 
that the drug would not be adopted by the consumer.200 This forced 
disclosure also undoubtedly causes some users unwarranted anxiety, 
which comes with a price of its own.201 
 
 197. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., supra note 193, at 136 (listing other important 
information about possible side effects with Orencia). 
 198. Id.; Orencia Side Effects, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/sfx/orencia-side-
effects.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
 199. Sarah L. Labor, Jon C. Schommer & Dev S. Pathak, Information Overload with 
Written Prescription Drug Information, 29 DRUG. INFO. J. 1317, 1324 (1995). 
 200. Lewis H. Glinert & Jon Schommer, Television Advertisement Format and the 
Provision of Risk Information About Prescription Drug Products, 1 RES. SOC. & ADMIN. 
PHARMACY 185, 190 (2005) (citing Prashant Tukaram Nikam, Impact of Risk 
Disclosures Through Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on Elderly Consumers’ 
Behavioral Intent (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University),  
available at 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap:10:0::NO:10:P10_Accession_Num:osu1054007801#abstract
-files). 
 201. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 352(a), 352(n), 
(2006) (authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to review and censor 
pharmaceutical advertisements). Last year, the FDA issued over twenty-eight warning 
letters citing pharmaceutical companies for allegedly misleading advertising. See  
Warning Letters of 2012, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementA
ctivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompani
es/ucm289143.htm (last updated May 17, 2013) (containing a list of FDA letters). One 
would think that the power to censor would be exercised in situations where an advertiser 
has grossly exaggerated the benefits of a medication, or otherwise made a statement that 
borders on the fraudulent. One would be wrong. Valeant Pharmaceuticals of North 
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Information overload may also cause consumers to ignore or 
minimize important information. Consider, for example, California’s 
Proposition 65, which “requires the State to publish a list of chemicals 
known to cause cancer or birth defects or other reproductive harm.”202 
The list contains over 800 chemicals.203 In addition, the Act provides 
that: “[n]o person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and 
intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to 
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and 
reasonable warning to such individual . . . .”204 The warning must 
“clearly communicate that the chemical in question is known to the state 
 
America, LLC was cited by the FDA for an advertisement which advised users that the 
dosing for its medication to treat Huntington’s disease, Xenazine, “should be 
individualized by starting low and going slow by 12.5 mg increments weekly until a 
patient experiences clinical effect without intolerable adverse events.” Letter from 
Quynh-Van Tran, FDA Regulatory Review Officer, & Mathilda Fienkeng, Team Leader, 
Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Madhu 
Anant, Sr. Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Valeant Pharm. N. Am., LLC (June 20, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enf
orcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceutic
alCompanies/UCM310539.pdf. The FDA found this warning to be misleading because 
it did not include the recommended starting and maximum dose for the medication. Id. 
Arbor Pharmaceuticals was cited for saying that its nitroglycerin spray product, used to 
treat angina, was “patient friendly” and “easy to use” because, according to the FDA, 
there was a lack of controlled studies to establish that a spray bottle was in fact “easy to 
use.” Letter from, Zarna Patel & Emily Baker, Regulatory Review Officers, Div. of Drug 
Mktg., Adver., and Commc’n, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Allison Lowry, Dir. 
of Quality & Regulatory Affairs, Arbor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Apr. 26, 2011), available 
at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enf
orcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceutic
alCompanies/UCM253623.pdf. Proctor and Gamble was cited for advertising a cold and 
flu product, “VICKS DayQuil Plus Vitamin C” and “VICKS NyQuil Plus Vitamin C” 
because “their respective labeling fail[ed] to identify vitamin C (ascorbic acid) as an 
active drug ingredient.” Letter from Deborah M. Autor, Dir., Ctr. For Drug Evaluation 
& Research, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Robert McDonald, President & Chief 
Exec., Proctor & Gamble (Oct. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2009/ucm188361.htm
. 
 202. Proposition 65 in Plain Language, OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD 
ASSESSMENT, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/pdf/P65Plain.Pdf 
(last updated Feb. 2013).  
 203. Chemicals Known to the State to Cause Cancer or Reproductive Toxicity, OFFICE 
OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 26, 2013), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/Prop65_list/files/P65single072613.pdf. 
 204. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992) (codifying Proposition 65). 
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to cause cancer, or birth defects or other reproductive harm.”205 The 
warning labels can be found on a wide range of consumer products sold 
in California and across the nation such as luggage, jewelry, and 
cosmetics. In his article Proposition 65: When Government Cries Wolf, 
David Henderson points out that while the warnings may make citizens 
of other states nervous, Californians, used to a barrage of warnings, 
dismiss them as white noise.206 Henderson noted that “warnings about 
low-probability threats drown out, rather than drive out, warnings about 
high-probability threats.”207 As an example, he points out that now that 
we are all used to the ominous Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”) warnings about terrorism, we tend to dismiss high-probability 
threats from the government as well.208 “Good information,” he notes, 
“is just too important for us to allow government to drive it out with bad 
information.”209 Indeed, who will take the same government that warns 
residents not to eat licorice seriously when a high-probability threat 
needs to be conveyed?210 Not surprisingly, Proposition 65 is a subject of 
controversy in California. Its critics charge, among other things, that the 
warning signs generated by the law “have become so ubiquitous they are 
virtually meaningless.”211 
 
 205. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27 § 25601 (2008). 
 206. David Henderson, Proposition 65: When Government Cries Wolf, LIBRARY OF 
ECON. & LIBERTY (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2013/04/proposition_65_1.html. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. CDPH Warns Not to Eat Red Vines Black Licorice, Snaps, and Mixed Bags 
Containing Black Licorice Candy, CAL. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 7, 2013, 11:46 
AM), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Pages/NR12-050.aspx. 
 211. Stephanie M. Lee, Prop. 65 Hazard Signs Arouse Controversy, SFGATE (Jan. 16, 
2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prop-65-hazard-signs-arouse-
controversy-4196557.php#page-2. The ubiquitous warnings that flow from Proposition 
65 also led to an increasing number of specious lawsuits in which plaintiffs claim that 
companies or business owners fail to adequately warn of danger. See Governor Brown 
Proposes to Reform Proposition 65, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (May 
7, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18026.ca.gov. California Governor Jerry 
Brown is leading an effort to curb what he views as an abuse of a well-intentioned policy. 
Id. Matt Rodriquez, secretary of California Environmental Protection Agency, stated 
that, “[u]nfortunately, [Proposition 65] has been abused in the past sometimes by those 
who have essentially used it to shake down small businesses and generate fees by 
bringing cases with little or no benefit to public health.” Lee, supra note 212 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). He cited a recent case in which Southern California residents 
claimed that some banks had run afoul of Proposition 65 by failing to adequately warn 
customers of second-hand smoke from smokers standing near entrances or ATMs. Id. 
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As with most emerging scientific principles, there are contrarians.  
Several studies have challenged the concept of information overload, 
essentially arguing a variation on the theme that consumers are capable 
of quickly filtering information irrelevant to their decision making 
process or otherwise adopt simplifying strategies designed to satisfice 
instead of optimizing.212 Ultimately, however, this debate takes on a 
different hue in the light of the First Amendment. Irrespective of which 
way the science ultimately leans, the First Amendment would seem to 
require that the tie should go to those who would wish to remain silent. 
As suggested above, forced commercial speech regimes are at least 
as problematic, if not more so, than simple restrictions on commercial 
speech.213 Unlike the latter, forced commercial speech is paternalistic, 
undermines autonomy, and interferes with the speaker’s interest in 
forceful, emotive expression, while at the same time interfering with the 
listener’s interest in self-fulfillment. The primary justification for 
imperative commercial speech, expanding the amount of information 
available to the consumer, can have the perverse effect of impairing the 
decision making process. 
E.  DOES COMMERCIAL SPEECH TRULY HAVE LESS WORTH? 
Decisions treating forced commercial speech differently than other 
kinds of speech are further rooted in the notion advanced in Virginia 
Pharmacy that commercial speech is simply less worthy of protection 
than other kinds of protected speech; but this conclusion is also open to 
debate, particularly in light of recent history. According to the Supreme 
Court, commercial speech is worthy of less respect for three reasons: (1) 
it is more capable of being verified than other forms of speech;214 (2) it 
 
 212. See, e.g., David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An 
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 287 (1986); see also Naresh 
K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 
419, 419 (1982). The studies contesting the notion of information overload are 
particularly suspect in light of Dr. Dimoka’s research, which shows the brain’s cognitive 
functions undergoing observable degradation when faced with too much information.  
See supra note 128. 
 213. But cf., Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and 
Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2003) (expanding of the 
work done by Professors Hanson and Kysar on market manipulation); see also supra 
note 178 and accompanying text. Professor Horowitz argues that the standard for 
regulating commercial speech should be more solicitous of the government. See Horwitz, 
supra note 214, at 67-68. 
 214. This conclusion is not uniformly held. For a criticism of the “verifiability” 
justification, see Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 
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has less value than other kinds of speech; and (3) it is more “durable” 
and less likely to be “chilled” than political speech because the advertiser 
is motivated by profit.215 
The first justification is essentially irrelevant to the debate because 
no court (nor this essay) has suggested that the government does not have 
the authority to regulate commercial speech that is objectively 
misleading. The government has a long-standing and compelling interest 
in preventing fraud, no matter the context. 
The continued validity of the “less value” justification, however, is 
brought into question, at least implicitly, in the Court’s recent decision 
in Entertainment Merchants,216 which struck down a California statute 
that (1) required video games which had violent conduct to display a 
warning label, and (2) restricted the sale of such games to individuals 
over the age of eighteen. The Court, following a long trend of cases 
which ruled that the mere fact a communication is offered for sale does 
not make it commercial speech, ruled that video games are a form of 
“art” worthy of First Amendment protection.217 Applying strict scrutiny, 
the Court ruled that the labeling and underlying ban could not be justified 
 
74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 385-86 (1979). (“[c]ommercial speech is not necessarily more 
verifiable than other speech. There may well be uncertainty about some quality of a 
product, such as the health effects of eggs. . . . On the other hand, political speech is often 
quite verifiable by the speaker.”) (citations omitted). 
 215. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771-72 n.24 (1975). 
 216. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011); see also Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (A “consumer’s concern for the free flow 
of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political 
dialogue.”). That reality has great relevance in the fields of medicine and public health, 
where information can save lives. A third justification is offered by Professor Baker, who 
argues that the profit motive “breaks the connection between speech and any vision, or 
attitude, or value of the individual or group engaged in advocacy.” C. Edwin Baker, 
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17 (1976). 
From this starting point, Baker concludes that commercial speech is worthy of less 
protection because it is not strictly tied to the concept of “self-expression”; which is 
obviously a foundational value animating the First Amendment. Id. at 3. Karl Marx, in 
contrast, argued in his theory of alienation of the proletariat class that work and the 
products of our labor are the ultimate form of self-expression. KARL MARX & FREDERICK 
ENGELS, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS 270, 
276-77 (Jack Cohen et al. eds., 1975). Taking the argument one step further, (and far 
beyond what Marx would allow) if we are what we produce, we are also what we sell. A 
craftsman advertising his home-made bird houses is very much expressing something 
about himself. 
217.  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.  
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under the strict scrutiny standard.218 
This decision raises the difficulty, if not impossibility, of drawing 
a firm line between “art” (fully protected) and “commercial speech” 
(subject to a lower standard of scrutiny). Consider advertisements that 
are run during the Super Bowl, which are among the most expressive, 
and expensive, form of commercial speech on the market. At one level, 
such ads are pure commercial speech in that they are designed and 
intended to sell a product. At another, however, they are treated much 
like art. The ads are scrutinized before and after the Super Bowl, much 
like art. They engender debate, scrutiny and invite controversy.219 
Advertisements tell stories, evoke emotions and can be both serious and 
whimsical, much like art.220 The paradigm set forth in Virginia 
Pharmacy of commercial advertisement being nothing more than an 
offer to sell “x” product at “y” price is long over. As stated by Justice 
Thomas, “there is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial speech’ . 
. . Indeed, I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent 
distinction between the commercial and noncommercial speech.”221 
Given the difficulty of drawing a distinction between “art” and 
“advertisement” a fair question can be asked: which is really more likely 
to be chilled by intrusive restrictions on speech, the professional artist 
who relies upon the sale of his works to live or the advertiser who relies 
on creating a “lifestyle” image to sell product? The artist faced with a 
government restriction has the choice of either changing the nature of 
her art to remove the offending element or to relegate herself to another 
 
218.  Id. at 2742.  
 219. See, e.g., Dani Blum, Enough is Enough: The Message the Super Bowl Sends to 
Teenage Girls, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013, 3:22 PM), 
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 221. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522, 523 n.4 
(1996)); see also supra Part III.C (arguing that advertisements are intended, in part, to 
facilitate self expression by the user of products). 
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line of work. The advertiser faces a similar choice: continue to advertise 
and face the consequences, or change the message. In either case, the 
compulsion is the same. 
IV.  LESS FORCED SPEECH DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO LESS 
INFORMATION 
Courts and commentators have struggled mightily to reconcile the 
forced speech and commercial speech doctrines. As discussed above, the 
D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. created a two tier structure: 
disclosures (1) necessary to prevent outright deception or (2) that 
communicate factual, non-controversial information are subject to 
rational basis review; otherwise Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
standard applies.222 Other courts would apply strict scrutiny, unless the 
disclosure is necessary to prevent outright fraud.223 The Sixth Circuit 
has gone to the other extreme, suggesting that all commercial forced 
speech regimes need only satisfy rational basis.224 
The distinction recognized by many courts between compelled 
political speech and forced commercial speech cannot stand. Justice 
Jackson’s ringing endorsement of the First Amendment, and the values 
that underlie it, apply with particular resonance here: “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein.”225 Government-imposed obligations on 
commercial speakers require them to mimic the “orthodox” view held 
by the bureaucrats and politicians that a particular product is good, bad 
or indifferent. Such government-imposed obligations are paternalistic, 
dilute the message favored by the speaker, and undermine the autonomy 
and self-expressive goals of the users of the particular product. Further, 
if current research on cognitive decision making is correct, in many 
cases, the forced speech likely has the paradoxical effect of interfering 
with rational decision making. In light of this, there would appear to be 
no legitimate justification for not extending the default “strict scrutiny” 
rule to government regulations which force commercial advertisers to 
speak, at least to the extent their speech is not deceptive. 
 
 222. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012); see also supra Part II.D.1.  
 223. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217-18. 
 224. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Sixth Circuit Approach).  
 225. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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A.  ADVERTISERS HAVE MARKET INCENTIVES TO DISCLOSE PERTINENT 
INFORMATION 
Applying an elevated standard of review to regulations compelling 
advertiser to speak messages contrary to their interests would not 
inexorably lead to less information being available to consumers who 
wish, in their exercise of autonomy, to obtain such information. While 
the government certainly has an interest in arming the public with the 
information necessary to make healthy choices, a First Amendment 
analysis of whether the government is overreaching by compelling 
speech should include a review of other methods available to achieve the 
same goals. Whether the public should be warned of the dangers of 
eating too much fast food is a different question than that of who should 
provide the warning. 
The government’s interest in an informed public is addressed in 
myriad ways, most of which do not involve literally putting words in the 
commercial speaker’s mouth. Despite an apparent governmental distrust 
of commercial speech, many companies recognize that full disclosure is 
good for business. For example, some baby formula companies go 
beyond FDA regulations to list nutrients to espouse the virtues of 
breastfeeding.226 Though an increase in breastfeeding moms means a 
decrease in lucrative formula sales, Gerber states in many of its print and 
television advertisements that “Gerber recommends breastfeeding as the 
best start for babies.”227 Gerber, on its own, responded to pressure from 
lactation advocates in the United States,228 and international concerns 
about aggressive marketing to mothers in third world countries whose 
babies suffered for lack of breastfeeding or misuse of formula.229 
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Notably, when the World Health Organization adopted a non-binding 
code restricting the promotion of infant formula products, the United 
States was the lone dissenter.230 Elliott Abrams, then Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Organization Affairs stated that: “ ‘[d]espite 
our governmental interest in encouragement of breast-feeding,’ . . . the 
W.H.O. recommendations for a complete ban on advertising to the 
general public of infant formula and the proposed restrictions on the flow 
of information between manufacturers and consumers ‘run counter to 
our constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom of 
information.’”231 The United States, despite an admitted interest in 
encouraging breastfeeding, decided, based upon First Amendment 
concerns, to neither restrict manufacturer’s free speech, nor compel 
advertisers to disclose accepted facts about the detriments of choosing 
formula over breast milk.232 Companies selling baby formula, however, 
may make a public relations and business decision to disclose 
information that could affect the bottom line. 
Even powerhouses like Coca-Cola respond to market pressure, 
recently pledging to make lower calorie drinks and provide clearer 
nutritional information.233 The move was a response to increased 
consumer and political criticism over the link between sugary soft drinks 
and myriad chronic health problems.234 New television advertisements, 
while reminding us that Coca-Cola alone is not responsible for the 
country’s health problems (“all calories count”), note Coca-Cola’s 
voluntary contributions to efforts to lower the sugar content in our diet, 
and list its wide-ranging “healthier” options.235 In a press release 
published on the company’s website, Muhtar Kent, company Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer states: “[o]besity is today’s most 
challenging health issue, affecting nearly every family and community 
across the globe. It is a global societal problem which will take all of us 
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working together and doing our part.”236  Coca-Cola has made a 
commitment to: (1) “offer low or no calorie beverage options in every 
market;” (2) “provide transparent nutritional information;” (3) “help to 
get people moving by supporting physical activity programs in every 
country where they do business;” and (4) “market responsibly, including 
no advertising to children under [twelve] anywhere in the world.”237 In 
addition to these promises, the company launched a web initiative called 
“Coming Together”; the website contains information about fitness, 
health and nutrition.238 
While not everyone trusts Coca-Cola to mitigate the negative 
health effects of its products,239 the company’s substantial use of 
resources in an effort to educate the public about its products and about 
health in general demonstrates the strong disclosure incentives provided 
by the marketplace. 
B.  TORT LAW AND INDEPENDENT SPEECH WILL ACT AS A CHECK ON 
ADVERTISERS 
Community organizations and advocacy groups also contribute the 
flow of information to consumers, and often present the “other side” of 
an advertisers rosy picture of its product. For example, as concerns about 
childhood obesity grew stronger, so did the voices seeking to get the 
word out to parents and children about the importance of eating right and 
exercising. In 2012, Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta made waves with 
its ad campaign to fight childhood obesity.240 Its controversial 
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Strong4Life campaign featured overweight children relaying, in their 
own words, their struggles with obesity.241 A separate ad played back 
the life of a thirty-four year old heart attack victim, tracing his problems 
back to his French fry diet as a toddler.242 These efforts help citizens 
make real choices, and force the market to conform to the needs of the 
better informed public. The proliferation of “healthy choices” at fast 
food restaurants and grocery stores is indicative of industry response to 
consumer demand. It may be helpful to consumers to know the calorie 
count in can of soda, but to “warn” consumers of the dangers of drinking 
too much of it should not to be the mandated role of the manufacturer. 
The legal system also provides a strong incentive for companies to 
fully disclose information relevant to the public’s safe consumption of 
its products. American tort law imposes upon manufacturers a duty to 
warn consumers of any danger that could flow from the intended, or 
unintended, but reasonably foreseeable use of its product.243 Even if the 
manufacturer provides a warning, it may still be held liable for harm 
done by its product if the warning was not “adequate.”244 Thus, for 
example, if research eventually shows that radiation from cell phones is 
harmful, cell phone manufacturers must relay that potential harm, or face 
liability for any damages caused to consumers. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, government is always free 
to express its own message in response to the messages promulgated by 
commercial advertisers. The government is a powerful conduit of the 
very information that it wants conveyed to the public.245 Public service 
announcements produced by the federal government, and intended to 
educate the citizenry, have covered wide-ranging topics such as 
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nutrition,246 drug abuse,247 and bullying.248 The government also speaks 
to the public through the promulgation of campaigns such as “Got Milk” 
and “Beef; it’s What’s for Dinner.” Concerns that consumers will not be 
educated if marketers are not required to disclose every perceived danger 
of their product are unfounded considering the market forces and 
government resources that lead to conveyance of information to the 
public. When the government itself provides information to the public, 
at least we know who is speaking, and there is less need to question 
motive, sincerity or accuracy.249 
Through these various channels, market incentives, education by 
government and community groups, and the legally imposed duty to 
warn, consumers receive a wealth of information to help them make 
rational decisions. Forcing marketers to go beyond the duty imposed by 
tort law to spread the government’s message unfairly impinges on the 
right of commercial speakers to promote their products, and could lead 
to confusion and misinformation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The distinction between regulations compelling commercial 
speech and direct regulation of artistic or political speech recognized by 
many courts is ultimately artificial and disrespects the values embodied 
by the First Amendment. If, as the Court suggested in Virginia 
Pharmacy, the value to the average citizen of commercial speech “may 
be as keen, if not keener by far”250 as political speech is true, the same 
rules should apply to both. Forced commercial speech, no less than other 
kinds of forced speech, should be subject to strict scrutiny. In the 
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marketplace of ideas, the market should win, and not the market 
regulator. 
 
 
 
